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A Report on—and an Invitation to Join—the
LatCrit NGO 
Tucker Culbertson
Inaugurated as part of the World Conference Against Racism, the Lat-
Crit NGO seeks to further the codification and implementation of human 
rights law and policy in egalitarian, historically informed, analytically ri-
gorous, sociologically real, and culturally sensitive ways.  In July 2006, the 
United Nations’ Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) granted our ap-
plication for consultative status.  With this status, and through other future 
endeavors, the LatCrit NGO pursues two interrelated goals:
(1) the interjection of critical and comparative analyses and arguments 
regarding identity subordination into current dialogues within interna-
tional legal and  political institutions; and 
(2) the provision of experiential learning opportunities for students as 
authors and advocates of the analyses and arguments described above. 
To this end, the LatCrit NGO seeks to establish a consortium com-
prised of: educational institutions, individual faculty members, clinical pro-
grams, academic centers, and community organizations willing to partici-
pate in producing work for distribution to ECOSOC and other international 
institutions.
Structurally, participation in the consortium might involve: ongoing or 
ad hoc contributions, existing courses or clinics, independent studies with 
individual faculty members and students, or student organizations.  
Substantively, participation in the consortium might: expand the exist-
ing undertakings and priorities of consortium members, advance ongoing 
initiatives of the LatCrit NGO, or respond to emergent time-sensitive issues 
under discussion by international institutions. 
Formally, work products by consortium students might include: ab-
ridged literature reviews synthesizing existing critical and comparative 
scholarship on a single topic in human rights law; policy briefs summariz-
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ing and critiquing the interpretation and enforcement of international legal 
instruments; “shadow” reports identifying and expounding upon omissions 
and discrepancies in official reports issued by governments or other NGOs; 
evidence gathering around local human rights violations; empirical analyses 
of the violation, enforcement, or adjudication of human rights law; amicus 
briefs; or other work products that offer critical or comparative arguments 
or analyses regarding human rights law. 
We are eager to speak with you and strategize ways in which the Lat-
Crit NGO can add to and draw from your work.  The scale and style of such 
collaboration would be tailored to your needs, capacities, and desires.  Will 
you join us? 
What follows is an example of our work: our response to a recent 
questionnaire from the High Commissioner on Human Rights regarding 
gaps and obstacles in existing international laws on racism, xenophobia, 
and related intolerance.  (The questionnaire itself is included for your refer-
ence.)  We hope this report gives you a sense of our general aims and spe-
cific initiatives.  We hope we can soon amend our priorities and projects to 
include new collaborations designed with you to supplement, support, or 
expand the important work you are doing.  
I. QUESTIONNAIRE ON COMPLEMENTARY STANDARDS ON RACISM,
XENOPHOBIA, AND RELATED INTOLERANCE 
A. Manifestations of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and  
Related Intolerance 
1.  Please provide your comments on the question as to whether there 
are normative gaps in the existing international legal instruments to 
combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intoler-
ance with regard to: 
a.  Multiple or aggravated forms of racial discrimination,  
b.  Ethnic cleansing,  
c.   Genocide,  
d.   Religious intolerance and defamation of religious symbols,  
e.  racial discrimination in the private sphere,  
f. Incitement to racial hatred and dissemination of hate speech 
and xenophobic and caricatured pictures, through traditional 
mass media and information technology, including the Internet,  
g.  Racial profiling,  
h.  Other? 
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2.  If you have identified any gaps, can you please propose normative 
contents that should be incorporated into the system of international 
legal instruments to fill these gaps? 
B. Protection of Victims of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, 
and Related Intolerance
1.  Please provide your comments on the question as to whether there 
are normative gaps in the existing international legal instruments to 
combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intoler-
ance with regard to the protection of: 
a.  Religious groups, 
b.  Refugees, 
c.  Asylum-seekers, 
d.  Stateless persons, 
e.  Migrant workers, 
f.  Internally displaced persons, 
g.  Descent-based communities, 
h.  Indigenous peoples, 
i.  Minorities, 
j.  People under foreign occupation, 
k.  Other specific groups? 
2.  If you have identified any gaps, can you please propose normative 
contents that should be incorporated into the system of international 
legal instruments to fill these gaps?  
C.  Responsibilities (Positive Obligations) of States Parties 
1.  Please provide your comments on the question as to whether there 
are normative gaps in the existing international legal instruments to 
combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intoler-
ance with regard to the establishment of related responsibilities, in 
particular, in the context of: 
a. Adopting and implementing comprehensive anti-discrimination 
legislation;
b.   Introducing legal definitions of types of discrimination in      
national legislation; 
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c.  Providing for special measures to ensure equality (equal        
opportunity and equal enjoyment);  
d.  Binding non-state actors and holding them accountable for     
discrimination;  
e.  Ensuring effective remedies for victims of racial discrimination 
and related abuses; 
f.  Applying appropriate rules, standards, and burdens of proof in 
discrimination cases; 
g.  Promoting equality and tolerance through policies including 
education on human nights, pluralism, and multiculturalism; 
h.  Establishing and empowering specialized national bodies.  
2.  If you have identified any gaps, can you please propose normative 
contents that should be incorporated into the system of international 
legal instruments to fill these gaps? 
D. Means and Avenues to Address the Possible Gaps 
1.  Please provide your comments on the suitability of the following 
ways to address the possible substantive gaps in the existing interna-
tional instruments to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobi-
a, and related intolerance: 
a.  Standard-setting  
i.  Adoption of complementary international standards 
1)  Amendment of the ICERD, 
2) Protocol to the ICERD, 
3) Adoption of other new instruments (conventions, declara-
tions) on issues such as, e.g., human rights education or reli-
gious intolerance as proposed during the discussions in the 
Working Group, 
ii. Adoption of regional standards  
iii. If the answers are positive, what should be the substantive 
scope of a given form of standard setting?    
b.  Standard-development 
i.  Adoption of general recommendations/comments by: 
1)  CERD, 
2)  Other treaty bodies, 
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ii.  Updating CERD’s guidelines for State reporting to encour-
age Parties to report on specific aspects of racial discrimination 
and xenophobia not addressed explicitly by treaty norms,  
iii.  Updating of reporting guidelines adopted by other treaty bo-
dies,
iv.  Updating OHCHR model anti-discrimination law to assist 
States in  adopting adequate anti-discrimination legislation com-
plying with their obligations under the ICERD and reflecting con-
cerns raised in the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action 
and in the Intergovernmental Working Group on the effective im-
plementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Ac-
tion, 
v.  If you have identified any gaps, can you please propose the 
substantive scope of a given form of standard development?  
II. GENEVA, FEBRUARY 2007
RESPONSE OF THE LATCRIT NGO TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE ON 
COMPLEMENTARY STANDARDS ON RACISM, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION,
XENOPHOBIA, AND RELATED INTOLERANCE
Latina and Latino Critical Legal Theory, Inc., (LatCrit) is an NGO in 
Special Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council of the 
United Nations. LatCrit is a network of people of color and its allies who 
are academics, lawyers, organizers, and others involved in multidimension-
al anti-subordination work addressing the intersection and mutual constitu-
tion of race, sex, gender, sexuality, language, religion, color, ability, and 
other categories of identity that justify and are produced by exploitative and 
interdependent systems of subordination.  We assert that subordination 
based on these identities, and on race and racism in particular, are both his-
torical and structural.  This understanding of race and racism prompts nor-
mative and institutional positions that are in some respects different from 
those found in the present International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).  In answering this question-
naire, we will introduce and apply our structural and historical analysis of 
race and racism by reference to elements of the ICERD and other texts that 
we find problematic or underdeveloped.  We have proposed draft language 
responsive to our analyses and arguments. 
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A. Manifestations of Race Discrimination 
The very concepts of race, races, and racism as we know them are fair-
ly recent historical phenomena.  In the wake of European colonization and 
conquest in South Asia, the North Atlantic, Africa, and the whole Western 
Hemisphere, various fields of knowledge and culture coalesced to diagnose, 
deduce, report upon, govern, civilize, save, dispossess, abduct, enslave, 
rape, and exterminate various races deemed lesser, savage, heathen, evil, 
stupid, primitive, or otherwise different from and deficient as compared 
with the peoples of European civilization.  Scientific, religious, literary, and 
other accounts of the several human races then justified the legal and politi-
cal subordination of these new races, which was already well under way.  In 
this way, when we speak of international antidiscrimination laws on race, 
races, and racisms, we are speaking of a very particular historical, cultural, 
and geopolitical legacy: the legacy of modern European colonization.   
Thus, it is most appropriate and important that the ICERD explicitly 
link its conception of race discrimination with European colonialism.1  This 
link illustrates the actual, historical specificity of these texts’ apparently 
universal address.  International laws on race discrimination are intertwined 
with a specific denomination of racism: European colonialism.  Though 
international antidiscrimination laws on race cannot be reduced only to mat-
ters of decolonization prompted by European occupation, such laws must at
a minimum effectuate exactly such decolonization.  Such laws also should 
take this context of decolonization as a jurisprudential paradigm for the 
development of other antidiscrimination regimes regarding race. 
Because international race discrimination law is a law of decoloniza-
tion, it is not a moral banishment of race as such from matters of law and 
policy. Quite the contrary.  This much is evident from the texts’ declarations 
that “affirmative action” is not discriminatory.2  This clear commitment in 
these texts should be emphasized: states must distinguish decolonization 
from deracialization.3
                                                                                                                          
1 The Preamble to the ICERD emphasizes that “the United Nations has condemned colonialism 
and all practices of segregation and discrimination associated therewith, in whatever form and wherever 
they exist, and that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 
of 14 December 1960 (General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)) has affirmed and solemnly proclaimed 
the necessity of bringing them to a speedy and unconditional end.” G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), at 47, U.N. 
Doc. A/98 (Dec. 20, 1965). 
2 E.g., Art. 1.2 of the ICERD. 
3 The great and cruel irony of contemporary U.S. Constitutional laws on racial inequality is the 
prohibition by the Supreme Court of “affirmative action” programs meant to redress the material histori-
cal consequences of centuries of diverse forms of racial subordination.  Thus, governments’ voluntary or 
mandatory distribution of work to racial minorities has been declared racially discriminatory. This of 
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Consequently, international antidiscrimination laws on race ought 
not—already do not—prohibit race-based policy as being necessarily a ma-
nifestation of race discrimination.  A reciprocal requirement, though, is not 
sufficiently addressed by existing law.  International antidiscrimination laws 
on race ought not prohibit race-based policy as the primary or predominant 
manifestation of race discrimination. 
Race is a social construction, meaning it is neither essential nor natu-
ral, but is rather a category of human thought and action. Race has not been 
addressed by, but rather produced through legal, commercial, religious, and 
other institutions.4  As such, foundational structures of law and governance 
—even and often especially those that appear race-neutral—must be recon-
structed in order to meaningfully counter racism.  Structural manifestations 
of racism must therefore be apprehended by international antidiscrimination 
law.  
Because of the aforementioned structural dimensions of race and rac-
ism, manifestations of race discrimination cannot be limited to individual 
claims of race-based animosity, stereotyping, or differentiation.  Rather, 
antidiscrimination jurisprudence must be—because race and racism are—
structural engagements in human relations and resource distribution.  As 
European colonialism surely did, international antidiscrimination law must 
impose upon radically diverse social scenes and actors so as to explicitly re-
engineer power relations among individuals and groups in local, national, 
regional, and global politics.  International antidiscrimination law must 
explicitly draw within its bounds all practices that are means or profits of 
racial subordination, be they public, private, differentiating, dominating, 
intentional, effective, subconscious, institutional, idiosyncratic, collective, 
or individual in their characters. 
                                                                                                                          
course is absurd. The international texts on racial discrimination, like other national constitutions, clear-
ly state that such acts of decolonizing reconstruction are not acts of race discrimination. 
4 Moreover, race is a narrative and psychosocial structure that produces human experience, even 
and often as a subconscious schema or script for cognition and behavior. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, 
The Intuitive Psychologist Behind the Bench: Models of Gender Bias in Social Psychology and Em-
ployment Discrimination Law, 60 (4) JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES 835 (2004); Linda Hamilton Krieger, 
The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment 
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Ian Haney-Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct 
and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717 (2000); Ian F. Haney-López, “A Nation 
of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985 (2007). 
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B & C. Remedies for and States’ Affirmative Obligations Regarding Race 
Discrimination 
As a consequence of all the foregoing, international antidiscrimination 
laws on race must not just prohibit and redress intentional, explicit, or other 
obviously racial policies of States Parties on behalf of individual petition-
ers.  International antidiscrimination laws on race must also urge states to: 
(1) Acknowledge and develop a programmatic commitment to coun-
tering the continuing legacies of European colonization; 
(2) Redress and reconstruct every disparate impact upon historically 
and presently subordinated racialized groups; 
(3) Research and provide material reparations to historically subordi-
nated racialized groups, including but not limited to those groups dis-
possessed, abducted, enslaved, raped, exterminated, or otherwise in-
jured by European colonization; 
(4) Instigate institutional scrutiny and reconstruction aimed at: 
(a) Counteracting particular relevant histories of racism; and 
(b)  Seeking counsel of historically and presently subordinated 
and/or struggling racialized groups.  
Also, and in particular, this historical and structural definition of race 
and racism speaks against the unmitigated deference to states’ disparate 
treatment of non-citizens established in the ICERD and other international 
rights instruments and institutions.  It seems that concern over the ways in 
which nationality and/or alienage coincide with race and racism partly ani-
mate this Questionnaire and the Durban Programme, given their emphases 
on xenophobia, migration, occupation, and profiling.  Such emphases are 
well-founded and should lead ultimately to a modification of international 
antidiscrimination laws’ deference to states as regards the difference alie-
nage makes. Race was originally and has been always a question 
of citizenship. Racial categories in law, science, religion, and philosophy 
functioned chiefly to place certain persons, peoples, lands, and cultures 
beyond legal recognition and political obligation.  Race was always a justi-
fication of injustice precisely because it entailed a refusal or reservation of 
citizenship. As such, a properly decolonizing international antidiscrimina-
tion law on race would require reconstruction of law and government as 
regards non-citizens.  The mandate for just treatment of aliens is already 
manifest in humanitarian law and human rights law.  The exception for and 
deference to states’ differentiation of non-citizens is thus problematic for 
the ICERD and any international rights instrument.  No doubt questions of 
migration, war, trade, and other matters may refer to and depend upon ques-
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tions of citizenship.  Such dependence is endemic to a society of nation-
states.  However, because of race’s historical and structural inseparability 
from nationality and citizenship, the categorical exclusion of states’ distinc-
tions of non-citizens from the reach of international antidiscrimination laws 
on race impinges profoundly and foundationally upon the capacity of such 
laws to comprehend race and racism.5
To challenge race discrimination as unjust necessarily entails a reci-
procal challenge to justice defined by citizenship.  Fundamental rights must 
be fully granted to non-citizens in every encounter with state governments 
if international race discrimination law is to actually encounter and counte-
ract the historical and structural force of racism. 
In addition to the foregoing list of obligations, under a historical and 
structural antidiscrimination regime: 
(5) Public and private institutions, groups, and individuals must rec-
ognize and enfranchise the fundamental rights of all, including indi-
viduals, groups, and institutions of allegedly foreign citizenship or 
origin.
In particular: 
(6) In practices of detention (whether matters of law enforcement, 
migration, or war) all persons must be granted: 
(a) The rights and privileges afforded States parties’ own citizens 
in criminal contexts;  
                                                                                                                          
5 In the United States this matter has been repeatedly and brutally made apparent.  Some manife-
stations of the mutual constitution of systems of racial and national subordination in the United States 
include: 
1) The Alien Act of 1789 in which citizenship under the new United States was immediately and 
for more than a century restricted to persons racialized as White; 
2)  The case of Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), in which the Supreme Court 
declared citizenship a natural, moral, and political impossibility for Africans and African Ameri-
cans;
3)  The internment of Japanese and Japanese-American residents and citizens during World War 
II; 
4)  The present U.S. government’s extraordinary and brutal systems of profiling, policing, and de-
tention in its “War on Terror.”  Such systems are officially reserved for aliens, and are often if not 
always discrimination based on national origin, color, race, and religion along with national citi-
zenship. See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terror-
ism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).  For commentary, see Neil K. Katyal & Laurence H.  
Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1298-1304 
(2002).  
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(b) The minimum standards of humanitarian law under States’ par-
ties own laws and customs as well as international law and custom; 
and
(c) The fundamental rights deemed fundamental under States’ par-
ties’ own laws and customs as well as international law and custom. 
Another contemporary global phenomenon speaks against the defe-
rence shown in international antidiscrimination and other human rights laws 
toward States regarding the relevance of citizenship.  All international laws 
crafted in the interest of individual dignity and freedom—especially but not 
exclusively antidiscrimination laws on race—must confront the conscious, 
ongoing, and deliberate failure of migrant-receiving countries to regulate 
justly low-wage labor migration. 
These migrations, this labor, and these failures to regulate justly are 
the cause and consequence of histories and systems of subordination based 
on race, national origin, color, and language.  Such issues have always been 
and are still necessarily matters of race, racism, and xenophobia, and must 
be reached by international antidiscrimination law. 
Unfortunately, the ICERD’s aptly broad definition of “racial discrimi-
nation” (recognizing not only race and colour, but also national or ethnic 
origin (Art. 1.1)) is undermined profoundly by the explicit allowance that 
States may distinguish, exclude, restrict, and allow preferences between 
citizens and non-citizens (Art. 1.2).  This problem sadly cannot be remedied 
by the subsequent caveat that such distinctions may not discriminate against 
any particular nationality.  Intentional or effective racial discrimination may 
nonetheless be perpetrated by a State’s migration policies.  For example, in 
the United States, workers of irregular status are not entitled to the remedy 
of back-pay when an employer unlawfully terminates them for engaging in 
the legally protected activity of union organizing.6  Consequently, the incen-
tive for employers to exploit workers in an irregular status increases, while 
workers’ rights to redress for exploitation decrease.7  Latina, Latino, and 
other racialized and nationalized minorities working in low wage employ-
ment, such as agriculture and construction, are thus systematically pipelined 
into workplaces with high rates of injury, death, discrimination, and exploi-
tation.  In this way, the deference found to States’ parties regarding citizen-
ship and migration in international human rights laws is counterproduc-
                                                                                                                          
6 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137 (2002). 
7 The Hoffman Plastic decision has resulted in a reduction of all labor and employment rights of 
migrant workers, who are usually also members of a historically and structurally subordinated racialized 
and/or nationalized group. 
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tive—especially but not exclusively in laws regarding race, racism, and 
xenophobia.  
Nonetheless, current international human rights laws declare alloca-
tions of visas (and other matters of migration policy) an incident of national 
sovereignty immune from scrutiny under international rights regimes. Re-
cent and important innovations, such as the Inter-American Court’s OC-18,8
still focus only on in-country treatment of residents according to this stan-
dard, which is problematically deferential to States.  The ICERD and other 
texts’ deference to States in matters of citizenship and migration, if not re-
considered and qualified, will surely and can only displace, transform, and 
legitimate racial discrimination under other guises.    
Recent laws move against this counterproductive deference, including 
the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Their Families (the “Migrant Workers Convention”), drafted 
specifically to address contemporary structures of racial and national dis-
parity and subordination.9   Economic, social, and cultural rights regimes 
empower the United Nations to scrutinize economic and social program-
ming relating to poverty and basic health indicators.  In a similarly structur-
al and affirmatively obligatory fashion, international human rights re-
gimes—especially but not exclusively international antidiscrimination laws 
on race—must recognize visa allocation (and other matters of migration 
policy) as a critical issue of human rights in the historically unique, structu-
rally contrived arrangements of contemporary multinational migration, pro-
duction, and exchange.   
Subsequent international human rights instruments, institutions, pro-
ceedings, and commentaries should and might heed the principles of the 
Migrant Workers Convention.  They should and might also heed the prin-
ciple articulated by the Inter-American Court on Human Rights on the 
Rights of Undocumented Migrants,10 in which it held that international 
principles of human rights prohibit discrimination on the basis of immigra-
tion status.11  In its opinion, the Court clearly articulates the obligations of 
States to ensure that once a worker enters into an employment relationship, 
“the migrant acquires rights as a worker, which must be recognized and 
                                                                                                                          
8 OC-18 is the Inter-American Court’s advisory opinion on the rights of undocumented workers. 
Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. OC-18/03 
(2003), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_18_ing.pdf. 
9 The Preamble of the Migrant Workers Convention articulates this concern quite precisely. 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families, 
G.A. Res. 45/158, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., 69th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/Res/45/158 (Dec. 18, 1990).  
10 The Legal Status and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, September 17, 2003, available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/serie_a_18_ing.pdf. 
11 Id.
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guaranteed, irrespective of his regular or irregular status in the State of em-
ployment,”12 outlining fundamental labor rights which must be respected, 
including the right of access to justice.13
As such, we propose that: 
(7) Receiving governments must recognize, decriminalize, legitimize, 
legalize, and regulate the massive flows of low wage labor migration 
that take place throughout—and are indispensable to—the global 
economy. 
(8) Future international law should affirm the holding in the Inter-
American Court’s OC-18 by stating that: 
(a) Once in-country and working, undocumented workers must re-
ceive the same rights and remedies as other workers; and  
(b) Special measures must be taken at all stages of migration to en-
sure that undocumented workers enjoy those rights. 
These final recommendations are crucial to international antidiscrimi-
nation laws on race.  Low-wage labor migration issues are often inherently 
and/or effectively matters of national origin, color, and language.  They are 
therefore also matters of race, racism, and xenophobia. 
                                                                                                                          
12 Id. at ¶ 134.
13 In the case of migrant workers, there are certain rights that assume a fundamental importance 
and yet are frequently violated, such as: the prohibition of obligatory or forced labor; the prohibition and 
abolition of child labor; special care for women workers; the rights corresponding to freedom of 
association and to organize and join a trade union; collective negotiation; fair wages for work 
performed; social security; judicial and administrative guarantees, a working day of reasonable length 
with adequate working conditions (safety and health), rest, and compensation.  The safeguard of these 
rights for migrants has great importance based on the principle of the inalienable nature of such rights, 
which all workers possess, irrespective of their migratory status, and also the fundamental principle of 
human dignity embodied in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration, according to which “[a]ll human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and 
should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
G.A. Res. 217A, at 73, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
